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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Arthur Gene Schmierer appeals from the district court's order denying his I. C.R.
35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2009, a Canyon County grand jury charged Schmierer in a Superseding
Indictment ("Indictment") with enticing children over the internet (Count I) and attempted
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen (Count 11). 1 (R., pp.27-28.)

Pursuant to a

binding Rule 11 plea agreement, accepted by the district court, Schmierer pied guilty to
Count I and to an amended Count II, which charged a second incident of enticing a child
through use of the internet; the parties and court agreed that Schmierer would be
sentenced to two consecutive five-year fixed terms, for a total of ten years fixed, and
that any indeterminate time would be left open.
L.17.)

(R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.18,

The United States Attorney's Office agreed to refrain from filing additional

charges (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.12, Ls.5-12), and Schmierer agreed to "waive any possible
deficiencies in the original charging" (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). Count II of the Indictment was
amended by the prosecutor presenting the court an Amended Superseding Indictment
("Amended Indictment").

(R., pp.49-51; Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.) The state did not

obtain a probable cause determination by the grand jury. (R., p.107 ("The Amended
Superseding Indictment was not signed by the Grand Jury.").)
1

The district court

Count II of the Indictment, attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, was
based on Schmierer using a telephone to set up a meeting with a supposed 13 year-old
girl -- actually an undercover adult female agent of Idaho's Internet Crimes Against
Children Task Force -- in order to engage in intimate sexual acts with her, and driving to
the arranged location for that purpose. (R., pp.7-8.)
1

sentenced Schmierer as agreed upon, adding that the two sentences would be for ten
years unified on each count, with five years fixed (consecutive). (R., pp.60-63, 66-67.)
In 2012, Schmierer filed an "IRC 35 Motion to Correct Illegal Sentences," arguing
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to convict him under Count
II of the Amended Indictment because probable cause had not been established by the
grand jury for that count. (R., pp.72-85.) After the state filed a response to Schmierer's
Rule 35 motion (R., pp.86-95), the court held a hearing on the motion, and subsequently
entered an Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, explaining, in part:
Here, Defendant specifically waived any defects in the charging
document. He agreed to the amendment to the Indictment that reduced
the attempted Lewd and Lascivious conduct charge to a lesser charge.
Having made such a waiver he cannot now claim that his sentence on the
"Amended Indictment" was illegal.
(R., p.108; see 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.15.)
Schmierer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.102-104.)

2

ISSUE
Schmierer states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence?
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over Count II of the
Amended Indictment, and, by pleading guilty, has Schmierer waived his right to a
probable cause determination on that count?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Count II Of The Amended
Indictment, And, By Pleading Guilty, Schmierer Waived His Right To A Probable Cause
Determination On That Count
A.

Introduction
Schmierer argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to allow

the state to amend Count II of the Indictment -- from alleging attempted lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen to alleging enticing children over the internet -- because the
new charge was not a lesser offense of the original charge and there was no probable
cause finding by the grand jury to support the new charge. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-16.)
Schmierer's claim fails because Count II of the Amended Indictment gave the district
court subject matter jurisdiction because it alleged Schmierer committed an offense in
the state of Idaho, and, by pleading guilty, Schmierer waived his right to have the grand
jury make a probable cause determination.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised at

anytime and is subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d
699, 701 (2004) (citing Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995)
and State v. Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998)).

C.

The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction In Regard To Count II Of The
Amended Indictment
Schmierer asserts "[t]he district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because

the Amended Superceding Indictment charged a crime that was not an included offense
under the original indictment, and in fact was an entirely different incident, involving a
4

different fictitious minor in Utah, than the facts voted on by the grand jury." (Appellant's
Brief, p.7.) Schmierer specifically contends, in sequence:
(1)

the amended Count II "was apparently for previous communications
with another law enforcement official pretending to be a minor in
Utah[,]"

(2)

"[t]he issue of whether the communications between Mr. Schmierer
and the fictitious minor in Utah constituted a crime was never
before the grand jury[,]" therefore,

(c)

the Amended Indictment "was invalid as the issue of whether Mr.
Schmierer could be charged with a crime based on his alleged
internet contact with the fictitious minor in Utah was never before
the grand jury."

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
In sum, Schmierer contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Count II, as amended, because it charged him with a new crime that had not been
subjected to a probable cause determination by the grand jury. 2

Review of the

amended Count II shows it bestowed subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 3
It is well established that it is the charging document that confers jurisdiction on a
district court. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) ('The
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the state
The fact that Schmierer may have been led to believe that the minor child he was
enticing through the use of the internet and/or telephone was from Utah is of no
consequence. She was not actually a minor child or from Utah. More importantly,
under l.C. § 18-1509A(5), "[t]he offense is committed in the state of Idaho for purposes
of determining jurisdiction if the transmission that constitutes the offense either
originates in or is received in the state of Idaho." According to the grand jury transcript,
Schmierer resided in Canyon County, Idaho, and made illegal internet and/or phone
communications with the fictitious underaged minor ("Emily Kotter") in Idaho. (Grand
Jury Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.9, L.22; p.14, L.20 - p.24, L.5; p.27, L.25 - p.37, L.4.)
2

3

Count II of the Amended Indictment contains no language of any "fictitious minor in
Utah" (see Appellant's Brief, p.10), nor does it contain any language suggesting the
offense occurred outside of Idaho (see R., p.50).
5

of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.") (citing State v. Slater, 71
Idaho 335, 338, 231 P.2d 424, 425 (1951)).

An indictment confers jurisdiction in a

criminal case if it alleges an offense was committed within the State of Idaho. State v.
Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621, 115 P.3d 710, 712 (2005). Whether the indictment is
sufficient to satisfy due process is a separate question, unrelated to whether the court
has jurisdiction.

!sL

State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Ct.

App. 2006) (noting the Idaho Supreme Court has "clearly differentiat[ed] between due
process and jurisdictional queries").

Thus, the only question relevant to the

jurisdictional analysis is whether the Amended Indictment alleged an offense in the
State of Idaho. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-758, 101 P.3d 699, 701-702 (2004).
Schmierer's assertion that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the amended Count II is incorrect. Count II of the Amended Indictment
charged Schmierer with the crime of enticing a child through use of the internet, in
violation of I.C. § 18-1509A,4 and in the State of Idaho, as follows:

4

I.C. § 18-1509A reads in relevant part:
(1) a person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony
if such person knowingly uses the internet or any device that provides
transmission of messages, signals, facsimiles, video images or other
communication to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or
actions, or both, a person under the age of sixteen (16) years or a person
the defendant believes to be under the age of sixteen (16) years to
engage in any sexual act with or against the person where such act would
be a violation of chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code.

(5) The offense is committed in the state of Idaho for purposes of determining
jurisdiction if the transmission that constitutes the offense either originates in or is
received in the state of Idaho.
6

That the Defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about
between November 22, 2008 and January 9, 2009, in the County of
Canyon, State of Idaho, did knowingly use the internet to solicit, seduce,
lure, persuade or entice by word or action or both, a person Defendant
believes to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage
in any sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of
Chapter 15, 61, or 66, Title 18, Idaho Code, and that the Defendant is at
least eighteen (18) years old.
(R., p.50.)

Inasmuch as Count II of the Amended Indictment charged that an existing Idaho
crime was committed by Schmierer in the State of Idaho (R., p.50), there was nothing
facially deficient about that amended count. 5 Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional
defect and the court had subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the Count II, as
amended. Schmierer's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the
Indictment is without merit.

D.

By Pleading Guilty, Schmierer Waived His Right To Have The Grand Jury Make
A Probable Cause Determination In Regard To Count II
Schmierer entered a guilty plea to Count 11 of the Amended Indictment pursuant

to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement. (R., pp.52-59; Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.18, L.17.) The
agreement called for Schmierer to plead guilty to enticing a child through use of the
internet instead of the charge of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
and to be sentenced to a minimum of two consecutive five-year fixed terms, for a total of
ten years fixed. (Tr., p.7, L.14 - p.11, L.22; R., pp.52-58.) Schmierer also agreed to
"waive any possible deficiencies in the original charging" (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8). At the plea

5

Although the district court did not base its denial of Schmierer's Rule 35 motion to
correct an illegal sentence on the same reasons expressed here, its ruling should
nonetheless be affirmed on appeal on the correct theory. See Row v. State, 135 Idaho
573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001) ("Where the lower court reaches the correct result by
an erroneous theory" this Court can apply "the correct theory" and affirm).
7

entry hearing, the state presented the court with an Amended Indictment, amending
Count II to allege enticing a child through the use of the internet; the state did not seek a
probable cause determination by the grand jury in regard to that count. (R., pp.49-51,
107; Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.)
Schmierer filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence in 2012, and after
a hearing, the district court denied the motion, ruling that Schmierer's guilty plea waived
his right to have the grand jury determine whether Count II of the Amended Indictment
was supported by probable cause. (R., pp.72-85, 107-109; 2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4,
L.15.) Schmierer has failed to show any error in the district court's decision.
The reason for having an indictment is to establish a finding of probable cause.
Article 1, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to
a finding of probable cause either through a grand jury or a preliminary hearing. See
State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 912 P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995).

With regard to

preliminary hearings, it is well-established that a defendant's right to a probable cause
determination can be waived. 19..,_; see also State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643, 671
P.2d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983).

It is also well settled that a valid plea of guilty,

voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and
defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings. 6 State v. Dunlap,
123 Idaho 396, 399, 848 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1993); Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671
P. 2d at 1106.

Schmierer's reliance on State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967), and
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525,261 P.3d 519 (2011) (see Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15),
is misplaced because those cases involved jury trials -- not, as here, a plea agreement
~hereby the defendant agreed to plead guilty to an amended (and less serious) charge.
6
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In Fowler, the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction because of a
defect in the preliminary hearing process.

The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded

Fowler waived his right to challenge the probable cause determination once he pied
guilty:
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his right to
contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a preliminary
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to require the
accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid plea of guilty,
voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects
and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings.
Here Fowler does not attack the entry and acceptance of his plea. His
plea of guilty to the restaurant burglary therefore constituted a waiver of
the procedure to determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the
preliminary hearing itself, on that charge.
Fowler, 105 Idaho at 643, 671 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added, internal citations
omitted). Here, the claimed defect is in the grand jury process, not the preliminary
hearing process. Nevertheless, the intents and purposes of these two events are the
same -- they both determine whether the state has sufficient cause, probable cause, to
hold the person for trial. There is no reason why a defendant can waive that probable
cause determination in one proceeding and not in another.
Although Count II of the Amended Indictment charged Schmierer with committing
a different offense than the original Count II, because Schmierer voluntarily pied guilty
to that amended count pursuant to a plea agreement, he waived his right to have the
grand jury make a probable cause finding in regard to it. Schmierer has failed to show
that his right to have Count II of the Amended Indictment screened for probable cause
was violated. Accordingly, Schmierer has failed to show any error in the district court's
denial of his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence.

9

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2014.

JOH , C. McKINNEY
Dep ty Attorney Genera

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of April, 2014 served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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